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The Downfall of Grease Hazard Technicians and
Products Delivery Specialists or "Why French Fry
Cooks and Pizza Delivery Guys Should Not Pad Their
Resumes": Scrutinizing Crawford Rehabilitation

Services, Inc. v. Weissman*
I. INTRODUCTION

Regardless of the form resume fraud assumes, it is usually detrimental to the employer and beneficial to the employee. Those who have
engaged in this form of creative expression feel that they need to embellish their resumes in order to have a chance of being hired. Therefore, many of those who practice resume padding take liberties with job
titles, previous duties, and past experiences.
Recently, case law has developed which is detrimental to those who
rewrite the history of their lives. In fact, precedent exists that allows
employers to use misstatements made by employees on resumes and
applications to shield the employers from claims of wrongful discharge.
Courts also allow employers to use misdeeds committed on the job discovered after the termination of the employee as a further defense to
wrongful discharge. Courts call this evidence, discovered by employers
after an employee files a lawsuit, after-acquired evidence.'
This Note will first discuss the splintered and varied ways that circuit courts have dealt with after-acquired evidence. Followed by a discussion of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 2 a U.S. Supreme Court case that streamlined the application of the after-acquired
evidence rule by allowing certain damages when public policy concerns
are present. Finally, this Note will dissect the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding in Crawford Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 3
and examine how this case has further added to the confusion of the
after-acquired evidence rule. More specifically, this note will analyze

Copyright~ 1999 by Hoang Huynh.
1. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 547.
2. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
3. 938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997).
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how the Colorado Supreme Court erred by deviating from the afteraquired rule in McKennon. 4
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS IN
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE SITUATIONS

A. The Varied Opinions of the Circuit Courts
Historically, circuit courts were split regarding their treatment of
after-acquired evidence as it applied to employees' rights against their
employers. The Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts, in
particular, addressed how after-acquired evidence was to be applied. 5
The conflict did not come from the use of after-acquired evidence because all the courts allowed the evidence to be admitted. The discrepancy between the courts' decisions arose out of their varied applications
of the after-acquired evidence. Some courts allowed the detrimental
evidence to extinguish the entire claim, while others limited the use of
the evidence to eliminate employee remedies of reinstatement and front
pay.6
The Sixth Circuit's analysis determined that the application of afteracquired evidence absolved the employer of any claims against it, if the
employee made material misrepresentations or omissions on their resume or application. 7 The court outlined two requirements before this
rule would apply. 8 First, the intentional misstatements must relate to a
factor the employer used in deciding whether to hire the employee. 9
Second, the employer must have actually relied on those misstatements.10 The court established these requirements as a safeguard against
employers freeing themselves from wrongful discharge claims by
"combing a discharged employee's record for evidence of any and all
misrepresentations, no matter how minor or trivial." 11 In doing this, the
Sixth Circuit used a method that resembled promissory estoppel. Thus,
the employer could not defend a claim of wrongful discharge unless it

4. Id.
5. See Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F.Supp. 314, 318 (D. N.J. 1993).
6. See id.
7. Id. at 320 (citing Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir.

1992)).
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 319-20 (quoting Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 320.
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showed that the employment contract with the employee was based on
the employee's fraudulent misrepresentations.
The Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automotive Insurance Co., 12 held that after-acquired evidence constituted a legitimate
reason to fire an employee. 13 The court, relying on Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 14 determined that it was
appropriate for courts "to 'make [an] after-the-fact rationale' regarding
the circumstances that would have existed absent the discriminatory
conduct. " 15 The court allowed retroactive application of newly discovered information to justify the employee's discharge. Thus, unlike the
Sixth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit did not require the employer to rely on
the employee's misrepresentation when it hired the employee. 16
The Seventh Circuit's application of after-acquired evidence is
more strict than the Sixth Circuit's. The Seventh Circuit allows the evidence to totally extinguish the employee's claim if the employer can
prove that the employee would have been terminated had the employer
known about the misconduct. 17 The court refused to assume that an employer would terminate all employees who had made material misrepresentations on their resumes or conducted themselves in an adverse
manner. In order to use the after-acquired evidence as a defense, the
employer is required to state that such misrepresentation or misconduct
by the employees was not tolerated, and that the employers would have
fired anyone who acted in such a manner. 18
In addition to the after-acquired evidence rule, the Eleventh Circuit
also addressed the issue of appropriate damage calculation. It reasoned
that "where after-acquired evidence provides the employer with a legitimate reason to fire the employee, reinstatement, front-pay, and injunctive relief are unavailable, but back-pay, attorney's fees, and nominal damages remain available. " 19 The court chose to allow employees to
pursue backpay because it thought that otherwise employers would "devote less resources to preventing discrimination" because the employers

12. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10m Cir. 1988).
13. See id. The case involved an insurance claims representative who sued on the basis of
age and religious discrimination but the court extinguished his claims when after-acquired evidence
showed that he had filed 150 false claims.
14. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
15. Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 319. (citing Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d
614, 623 (4'h Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984)).
16. See id. at 319.
17. See id. at 320.
18. /d.
19. Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 321 (discussing Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,
1184 (II m Cir.1992)).
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could escape liability by investigating the employee's background?0
The court believed that even though the after-acquired evidence justified the termination of an employee, "courts must strike a balance between preserving the employer's lawful prerogatives to fire employees
and the statutory requirement to make persons whole for injuries suffered from illegal employment decisions. " 21
The lack of continuity between circuits prevented the establishment
of uniform rules on which employers and employees could rely. To
remedy this lack of uniformity between the circuits the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.

B. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
Christine McKennon, a 62-year-old woman, was employed as a
secretary at Nashville Banner Publishing Company for 30 years before
she was discharged. Nashville Banner claimed its work force reduction
plan for financial restructuring was the reason McKennon's employment was terminated.ZZ However, McKennon believed that her age was
the real reason behind Nashville Banner's decision to discharge her. 23
She filed suit, 24 alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 25
After-acquired evidence surfaced during McKennon's deposition.
McKennon admitted that she had stolen financial records from the
comptroller's office during the final year she worked at Nashville Banner. 26 She explained that her sole motive for acquiring the confidential
financial records was to have some "insurance" and "protection" because she anticipated her wrongful termination. 27 Shortly after these
statements were recorded in the deposition, McKennon received a correspondence from Nashville Banner stating that they were terminating
her employment because her actions were in direct conflict with her

20. See Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 321 (discussing Wallace, 968 F.2d 1174). Wallace v. Dunn
Constr. Co. was based on a claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII. Thus, the court may
have been trying to effectuate the purpose of the law in passing down this particular decision.
21. Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 321.
22. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354 (1995).
23. See id.
24. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 354. The basis for her claim comes from the fact that the
"ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer: 'to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age."' !d. at 355 (quoting the language of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq. (1988 and Supp. V)).
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq. (1988 and
Supp. V).
26. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 355.
27. See id.
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duties with the organization. Nashville Banner also stated that it would
have promptly terminated McKennon at an earlier date if it had known
of her grievous misconduct. 28 The company then filed for summary
judgment based on the after-acquired evidence. 29
The district court granted the summary judgment request holding
that Nashville Banner had the right to terminate McKennon because of
her misconduct. 30 The court also barred McKennon from recovering
"back pay [or] any other remedy ... available to her under the
ADEA. " 31 McKennon appealed but the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision. 32 McKennon appealed this decision and was granted certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the writ because it
wanted to "resolve conflicting views among the Courts of Appeals on
the question whether all relief must be denied when an employee has
been discharged in violation of the ADEA and the employer later discovers some wrongful conduct that would have led to discharge if it had
been discovered earlier. " 33
The Supreme Court was not comfortable with the lower court's
conclusion that after-acquired evidence could completely extinguish the
employee's ability to recover anything under the ADEA. 34 The Court
refused to ignore the fact that the employer violated federal law and
discriminated against an employee by terminating the employee on the
sole basis of age. 35 However, the Court did not want to limit its analysis
of the effect of after-acquired evidence to violations of the ADEA. It
recognized that the "ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to
protect employees in the workplace nationwide. " 36 Quoting Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, the Court stated that ADEA and Title VII share
a common goal in that they both seek to achieve "the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace. " 37 The Court observed that these statutes achieve their goals through deterrence and compensation. Thus,
the Court concluded that "[i]t would not accord with this scheme if af-

28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 356.
33. Jd.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. /d. at 357. The court referred to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et. seq. (1988 and Supp. V); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
12101 et. seq. (1988 Supp. V); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a); the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
37. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756

(1979)).
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ter-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operates . . . to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the
Act. " 38 However, the Court struggled because it could not ignore the
after-acquired evidence for fear of absolving the employees of their
misconduct.
First the Court considered the theory of unclean hands:
Equity's maxim that a suitor who engaged in his own reprehensible
conduct in the course of the transaction at issue must be denied equitable relief because of unclean hands, a rule which in conventional
formulation operated in limine to bar the suitor from invoking the aid
of the equity court. 39

The Court deemed the theory of unclean hands inappropriate for situations in which the "private suit serves important public purposes. " 40
Thus, in such situations the Court considered that one person's misconduct should not stand in the way of developing case law that would
benefit society. 41
The Court finally held that deference had to be given to the ADEA,
and that after-acquired evidence should be considered, "not to punish
the employee, "42 but to allow the employer to prosecute a claim to
which it is entitled. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that
"[a]n absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay ... would undermine the ADEA's objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motivations. " 43 The Court also provided a framework by
which lower courts may calculate the appropriate amount of backpay by
calculating the amount accrued from the time of the wrongful termination to the time the after-acquired evidence was discovered. 44
McKennon set an important precedent for handling after-acquired
evidence. It resurrected some remedies for employees and prohibited
the use of after-acquired evidence in situtations where public policy
concerns were present. McKennon, however, did not address the application of the after-acquired evidence in situations where no public policy conerns were involved. McKennon was also unclear whether the
doctrine of unclean hands applies to situations in which there is only a
private individual and the employer. The Colorado Supreme Court, in

38. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358.
39. /d. at 360.
40. /d. (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. lnt'l Parts Corp., 342 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)).
41. See id.
42. /d. at 362.
43. /d.
44. See id.
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Crawford Rehabilitation Services Inc. v. Weissman, took it upon itself
to answer these questions. 45
III. CRAWFORD REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC. V. WEISSMAN

A. Facts
Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. employed Susan Weissman
as a clerical typist from 1988 to 1990. Susan Weissman argued with
Leonard Francois, her manager at Crawford, regarding the number of
breaks that an employee is entitled to take during day. After the argument, Weissman telephoned the Department of Labor to inquire about
her rights to breaks at work. Weissman continued to take her rest
breaks after being informed that Crawford could not prohibit her
breaks. Subsequently, on January 25, 1990, Weissman asked her superiors if she could take the following Monday off work. When she was
told that she could not take the day off, Weissman informed her supervisor that she would not show up for work on Monday. 46 On Friday,
January 26, 1990, Weissman took the day off without permission. She
also did not show up for work on the subsequent two days. Following
her absence on January 30th, Crawford terminated Weissman's employment. 47
After her termination, Weissman brought a cause of action claiming
breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, outrageous conduct,
and wrongful discharge, seeking punitive and compensatory damages. 48
The claim for wrongful discharge stemmed from the argument between
Weissman and Francois. Weissman claimed that Crawford was angered
by the fact that she placed the telephone call to the Department of Labor, and this was the main reason for firing her. 49
Unlike McKennon, the evidence in Weissman concerned misrepresentations made by Weissman on her application for employment rather
than misconduct on the job. 50 As in McKennon, the after-acquired evidence surfaced during the deposition of the plaintiff. 51 The deposition
revealed that Weissman had failed to state on her application that she
was discharged from the Association of Operating Room Nurses

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Crawford Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540 (1997).
See id. at 543.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 543-44.
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(AORN), that she did not actually work full-time at Kirk Advertising
but on a part-time basis, and that she previously sued an employer over
an allegedly wrongful termination. 52 When trying to explain her discrepancies, Weissman stated that she did not "list AORN as a previous
employer because she believed she was prohibited from doing so by the
terms of a release she signed .... " 53 However, she used the same reasoning to justify her erroneous statement that she worked at Kirk Advertising full-time when, in fact, she only worked on a part-time basis. 54
After discovering these misstatements, Crawford filed a motion to
dismiss the case due to the newly discovered evidence uncovered in the
deposition. The court held that Weissman's fraudulent statements
voided any existing employment contract between Crawford and
Weissman. 55 The trial court granted Crawford's motion to dismiss the
"claims for breach of implied contract and promissory estoppel on the
theories of unclean hands, fraud in the inducement, and the afteracquired evidence doctrine ... [and] that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine precluded the claim for wrongful discharge. "56 The court also
dismissed the claim of outrageous conduct because Weissman failed to
properly state a basis for relief. 57 Weissman appealed and the court of
appeals granted a review. 58 The court of appeals sustained dismissal of
the claim of outrageous conduct but reversed on the issue of wrongful
discharge. The court of appeals relied on McKennon's decision, which
stated that an employee's rights to backpay could not be extinguished
by newly discovered evidence of the employee's misconduct. 59 The
court of appeals remanded the claim of breach of implied contract and
promissory estoppel, stating that Weissman's situation was not one that
constituted a public concern. 60

52. See id. at 544.
53. /d. at 545.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. !d.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 546.
60. The court stated that since there were no public concerns the claims could be eliminated
under the idea of "resume fraud if: (1) the misstatement or omission related to a material fact; (2)
it related directly to the evaluation of the application; and (3) it was reasonably relied upon by
Crawford in hiring Weissman." !d.
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B. The Colorado Supreme Court's Holding
The Colorado Supreme Court granted review. In its analysis of the
claims for breach of implied contract and promissory estoppel, the
court relied on case law that discussed the after-acquired evidence doctrine and "[b]asic principles of law and equity .... " 61 In its examination of Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 62 the court held
that newly discovered evidence that shows an employee in an unfavorable light can be used by employers to protect themselves from liability
and to limit relief. 63 The court reasoned that "an employee cannot complain about being wrongfully discharged because the individual is no
worse off than she would have been had the truth of her misconduct
been presented at the outset. " 64 In other words, the employee never had
a legally binding contract with the employer because the employment
relationship was formed under the influence of the employee's misstatements. The court also applied a rule based on contract theory that
allows a party who has been fraudulently induced into entering a contract to break the contract and "restore the status quo." The court reasoned that this rule also applies in situations where the employee misconduct was not discovered until after the wrongful termination. 65
The court used the doctrine of unclean hands to examine the use of
after-acquired evidence. The doctrine of unclean hands is based on basic principles of equity which state that "he who seeks equity should do
equity and come with clean hands. " 66 Thus, persons seeking an equitable remedy must not have engaged in any misconduct. Therefore, employees who either made material misstatements in their resume or engaged in misconduct on the job should not be able to recover from their
employers because employees are not entirely innocent. As to the claim
of wrongful discharge, the court held that Wiessman did not state a
"cognizable cause of action" that would allow her to recover any reme67
dies.
61. See id.
62. 35 Cal. App. 4th 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
63. See id. This case was about a husband and wife who were fired from a law firm. It was
later discovered that the wife had illegally taken some documents.
64. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 547 (quoting Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan
Soc'y, 921 P.2d 224, 226 (1996), aff'd (Kan. 1997)).
65. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 548. (using the analysis in Bassi v. Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. which stated that "after-acquired evidence may completely bar a claim for breach of the
employment contract because the employer's duty arises from the contract itself and falls with that
contract." Bassi v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 808 F.Supp. 1306, 1309 (E.D.Mich.
1992)).
66. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 548 (quoting Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595
(Colo. 1951)).
67. !d. at 551.
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The court stated that the only exceptions to the at-will employment
law in Colorado are public policy and implied contract exceptions. The
public policy exception protects an employee from termination by the
employer for refusing to participate in illegal activities. 68 In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 69 the Colorado Supreme Court held that in order
to present a prima facie case for wrongful discharge, an employee must
show:
[T]hat the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act as
part of the employee's work related duties or prohibited the employee
from performing a public duty or exercising an important job-related
right or privilege; that the action directed by the employer would
violate a specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to
the employee's basic responsibility as a citizen or the employee's right
or privilege as a worker; and that the employee was terminated as the
result of refusing to perform the act directed by the employer. 70

The court also held that the public policy exception only applies
when the issue at hand "affects society at large rather than a purely personal or propriety interest of the plaintiff or employer . . . [and] lead to
an outrageous result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy ...
or 'strike[s] at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities. "' 71 Applying these guidelines, the court held that neither
Weissman's right to contact the Department of Labor nor her right to
take breaks rose to the level of a public policy concern. 72 In determining this, the court cautioned that the development of case law for the
public policy exceptions should be done carefully. It stated that an issue
must be thoroughly examined before it be considered a public policy
concern. 73 The court did not elaborate on whether the use of "afteracquired evidence of resume fraud would completely preclude an employee's action for retaliatory firing in violation of public policy or
whether McKennon would operate to limit the application of the afteracquired evidence rule. "74

68. See id.
69. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
70. /d. at 109.
71. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981) (citations omitted)).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 553.
74. /d.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

A.

Background of the Public Policy Exception

Courts have never been able to clearly answer the question of what
constitutes a public policy matter in employer-employee relationships.
The conflict arises out of the "difficulty ... in determining where and
how to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve matters of
public policy, and those that concern merely ordinary disputes between
employer and employee. " 75 Courts have distinguished public policy
matters from private matters by specifying that public policy matters
affect society at large rather than any of the individual or proprietary
interests of the plaintiff, and that the "policy must be 'fundamental,'
'substantial' and 'well established' at the time of the discharge. " 76
Courts have generally found that clear public policy violations arise in
four employment situations. 77
The first situation occurs when an employee refuses to perform
certain illegal acts and is terminated as a result. 78 Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters79 is a prime example of this situation. The teamsters hired Petermann as a business agent, but fired him
when he refused to commit perjury. The court, though recognizing the
importance of an at-will employment relationship, refused to allow
Teamsters to terminate Petermann because he would not commit perjury.80 The court reasoned that it would be contrary to the state's interests and public policy to allow an employer to terminate an employee
for refusing to commit an illegal act. 81 The court concluded that to preserve the integrity of state law, "the civil law ... must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose
employment is for an unspecified duration .... " 82 In essence, the
court found that to allow terminations predicated on the failure of an
employee to commit an illegal act under state law would promote the
very behavior that the state wishes to restrict.
The second public policy violation in the employment relationship
occurs when the employer acts in a manner that prevents the employee

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 683 (Cal. 1992).
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1998).
See Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 683.
Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
/d.
See id. at 27.
See id.
/d.
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from performing the employee's legal responsibilities. These cases involve statutes that courts consider as important American institutions;
statutes that confer important obligations onto the citizens. 83 The court
in Nees v. Hocks 84 held that jury duty was a statutory obligation that
should be protected from employer interference. The court, using a
balancing test that weighed the community interest in having jury duty
with an employer's rights to terminate an employee, concluded that the
government's extensive steps to guarantee jury trials demonstrates the
importance of allowing citizens to serve on juries. 85 The court concluded that allowing employers to sanction employees in order to dissuade the employees from performing their legal obligations would
contradict the purpose of the law. 86
The third situation courts have declared a public policy violation
occurs when an employer prevents an employee from exercising a
statutory right or privilege. In Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Association, 87 the court found that an employer who terminated employees
because of their involvement in union activities violated public policy. 88
The court went even further, creating a cause of action for employees
where their employers had prevented them from exercising their rights
and privileges. 89
The final public policy exception applies to an employee who reports an employer's illegal activity. Hentzel v. Singer Co.CXJ dealt with
such a situation. In Hentzel, the court reasoned that allowing employees
to report illegal actions performed by employers is beneficial to employers because it increases employee morale. 91 Moreover, allowing
this type of system forces the employer to obey the law, thus benefiting
society as a whole. 92
The four situations where courts find public policy violations in the
employment relationship all involve statutory violations. Some courts,
however, have found that besides legislation, "administrative rules,
regulations or decision[s] and judicial decisions" are sources from
which public policy can be derived and then used to limit the at-will

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
1969).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n., 79 Cai.Rptr. 543, 547 (Cal. Ct. App.
See id. at 547.
See id. at 548.
Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
See id. at 164.
See id.
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employment relationship. 93 This broad view of the public policy exception is best articulated in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. ,94 in
which the Illinois Supreme Court wrote that "[i]n general, it can be said
that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the State collectively. Public policy is to be found in the
State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial
decisions. " 95 Some courts, not wanting to confine public policy though
wary of giving courts free rein, have only marginally expanded the
public policy exception to include clear legislative mandates or judicial
decisions. 96
Though these differing views of public policy add to its amorphous
nature, there are a few shared themes. First, courts agree that a public
policy exception should not be applied in cases that only concern an individual right and do not affect society as a whole. This is difficult because the analysis of the individual is usually intertwined with the
analysis of the group. Second, when an employee is terminated for reasons contrary to the purpose of a statute, it is appropriate to perform a
public policy analysis. Third, courts have to be cautious in granting a
public policy exception. The public policy exception is "notoriously resistant to precise definition, and that courts should venture into this
area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the
legislative branch, 'lest they mistake their own predilections for public
policy which deserves recognition at law.' " 97 Thus, courts should carefully scrutinize every claim based on public policy arguments.

B.

How Erring on the Side of Caution Led to Inconsistent Case Law

The court in Weissman 98 based its decision on previously constructed criteria that an employee must prove that "the action[s] directed by the employer would violate a specific statute relating to the
public health, safety, or welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee's rights as a worker. " 99
The court found for Crawford Rehabilitation because it determined that
Weissman was not able to show that there was any "clearly expressed
93. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
94. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E. 2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
95. /d. at 878.
96. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Minn Ct. App.
1986).
97. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 687 (quoting Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal.
1992)) See also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hasp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Ariz. 1985).
98. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552.
99. /d. at 553 (quoting Rocky Mountain Hasp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519,
524 (Colo. 1996) (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992)).
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public policy relating to an employee's basic rights or duties." 100 The
court was not able to discern any clearly expressed public policy because it was too anxious to follow other courts. The court failed to see
that Weissman's claims would pass both the strict statutorily-based
public policy exception requirements and the broad public policy requirements that have been laid out by other courts.
The court's failure to acknowledge Weissman's public policy arguments is especially apparent when it held that no public policy concern
was implicated when an employee was terminated for inquiring about
her rights in the workplace. 101 The court failed to implement the proper
public policy analysis in coming to its decision. This issue was not just
a private matter between Weissman and Crawford, but a public matter
that concerned the general relationship between employers and employees. This public policy concern is evidenced by legislative purpose as
well as general notions of public welfare.

C.

The Public Policy Reasoning for Employee Inquiries

The court erred when it decided that Weissman's claim for wrongful discharge was not based on public policy concerns. The wrongful
discharge claims were based on Weissman's allegations that she was
fired because she contacted the Department of Labor to inquire about
her right to take rest breaks. 102 Instead of focusing its public policy
analysis on Weissman's rights to rest breaks, the court should have focused its analysis on Weissman's right to inquire about her rights. 103
The real issue was whether it was acceptable for employers to terminate
employees for securing information about employees' rights at work.
Analyzed under this light, the cause of action would pass both the narrow legislation-based public policy test and the less constrained test of
public policy.
The freedom of an employee to inquire about workplace rights
passes the public policy test because it falls under one of the four situations in which courts have generally found a public policy violation.
Crawford's termination of Weissman for inquiring about her rights
violates the rule that an employer cannot prevent an employee from exercising a statutory right or privilege. Although legislation specifically
prohibiting employers from terminating employees for inquiring about
their rights does not exist, it is implied in most employee rights legisla-

100.
101.
102.
103.

See Weissman, 938 P.2d at 553.
/d. at 541.
See id. at 543.
See id. at 551.
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tion. It would be illogical to construct laws that protect employees and
then allow employers to restrict employee access to these laws.
If an employer is allowed to terminate an employee for inquiring
about workplace rights, then an employer can, in effect, bypass its legal
obligations. The employer could keep working conditions below legal
standards and the risk of being terminated would deter employees from
inquiring about their rights. Employers would also have incentives to
terminate those employees who know their rights. Thus, legislation designed to protect employees from poor working conditions would be
frustrated. The court's analysis in Weissman is faulty because Weissman's cause of action was based not on her right to take breaks, but on
her right to ask about her rights at work. The court erroneously determined that the main issue in Weissman was a private matter and not of
public concern.
Since this issue centers on the ability of all employees to inquire
about their employment rights and not just on Weissman's individual
rights, the issue lies in the public policy sphere. As previously discussed, not only does this decision create incentives for employers to
terminate employees for inquiring about their rights, it encourages the
termination of employees who uncover deficiencies in the workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of after-acquired evidence in employment situations has
developed in a slow, confusing manner. The McKennon decision clarified much of this confusion and established firm rules for the use of after-acquired evidence. However, as seen in Weissman, the application
of these ideas remains difficult. This difficulty comes from the reluctance of courts to determine which employment situations rise to the
public policy level. The court in Weissman erroneously ignored the
rules formulated in McKennon, stating that the claims of the plaintiff
were not a matter of public policy. The court in Weissman should have
viewed the situation as involving a public policy concern because the
situation fell into one of the four instances where courts typically find a
public policy issue in the employment relationship. This also shows that
a rule on how to identify a public policy matter in relation to employment situations must be established in order for the McKennon rule to
be applied effectively.
Weissman is a prime example of how courts can still complicate the
after-acquired evidence issue by not correctly categorizing a claim as a
public policy matter. The court was overly cautious in its application of
the rule and failed to broaden its focus. It failed to consider the broad
effects of its ruling on the employment relationship in Colorado. In
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finding that an employee, who entered into the employment relationship
under false pretenses, has no cause of action when an employer does
not follow termination procedures in an employee manual, the court absolves employers of their bad acts. This is contrary to Weissman's conclusion that an employer should not be allowed to get away with discharging an employee in a manner that the public would not tolerate.
The Court's decision also ran contrary to McKennon's findings when it
decided that employees inquiring about their rights at work is not a
matter of public policy. The decision allows employers to get away
with keeping their workforce ignorant as to their rights, thus possibly
creating dangerous working conditions. The court also contradicted itself when it failed to see that an employee may be granted a cause of
action based on statements made by an employer in an employee manual.
The court in Weissman did not answer the questions left in the wake
of McKennon because it failed to properly apply the public policy
analysis. The findings in Weissman run contrary to McKennon's ideas
of punishing the employer even though the employee was also at fault.
This should serve as an illustration of the inconsistent case law in afteracquired evidence that still exists after McKennon.
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